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Abstract
This note employs the recently established consistency theorem for
infinite regresses of probabilistic justification [F. Herzberg, Studia Logica,
94(3):331–345, 2010] to address some of the better-known objections to
epistemological infinitism. In addition, another proof for that consistency
theorem is given; the new derivation no longer employs nonstandard
analysis, but utilises the Daniell–Kolmogorov theorem.
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1 Introduction
It has been shown recently that infinite regresses of probabilistic justification are
‘consistent’ in a natural and mathematically rigorous sense (Herzberg [2010]).
In the present note, we shall examine how this finding can be employed
to defend infinitism even conceptually at various fronts. We shall focus on
propositional justification, because the said consistency result primarily pertains
to propositional justification and because anyway “doxastic justification is
parasitic on propositional justification” (Klein [2007a, 2007b]).
The paper is structured as follows. First (in Section 2), we shall show
how the mathematical analysis of infinite regresses of probabilistic justification
(pioneered by Peijnenburg [2007]) can serve to illustrate Klein’s notion of
increasing warrant (i.e. increasing with the number of steps of — in this
case: probabilistic — justification). Thereafter, in Section 3, we shall provide,
partly on the basis of Herzberg’s [2010] consistency theorem, counterexamples
to Gillett’s [2003] ontological attack on infinitism. Finally, in Section 4,
we shall address a possible foundational concern regarding the consistency
theorem for probabilistic regresses and its proof. In this connection, we will
note the possibility of proving the consistency theorem for infinite regresses
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of probabilistic justification without nonstandard analysis; indeed, Appendix A
provides such a “standard” proof by means of a classical measure-theoretic result
that is commonly used for the construction of stochastic processes: the Daniell–
Kolmogorov theorem.
2 Increasing warrant
Recall that infinitism agrees with coherentism regarding the progressive and
provisional nature of justification:
“[T]he infinitist does not think of propositional justification as a
property that is transferred from one proposition to another by such
inference rules. Rather, the infinitist, like the coherentist, takes
propositional justification to be what I called an emergent property
that arises in sets of propositions. In particular, the infinitist holds
that propositional justification arises in sets of propositions with
an infinite and non-repeating structure such that each new member
serves as a reason for the preceding one. Consequently, an infinitist
would seek to increase the doxastic justification for an initial belief
— the belief requiring reasons — by calling forth more and more
reasons. The more imbedded the initial belief, the greater its
doxastic justification.” (Klein [2007a, p. 26])
This “progress of [. . . ] knowledge” (Klein [2007b]) — i.e. the progress of
propositional and hence also of doxastic justification (the latter being parasitic
on the former) — can be illustrated as a process comparable to buying a car
on payments (Klein [2007a, p. 28]). A more formal, mathematical illustration
of this “progress of [. . . ] knowledge” can be derived from the mathematical
analysis of the probabilistic regress problem (cf. Peijnenburg [2007], Peijnenburg
and Atkinson [2008] and Herzberg [2010]): For, after n steps of probabilistic
justification, one has the following equation for the probability of the proposition
S0 in question:
P (S0) = P (Sn+1)
n∏
i=0
γi +
n∑
`=0
β`
`−1∏
i=0
γi,
wherein for all k ∈ N
αk = P (Sk|Sk+1), βk = P (Sk|{Sk+1), γk = αk − βk. (1)
Since P (Sn+1) is unknown and P (Sn+1)
∏n
i=0 γi may be rather small (unless
γi tends to one very rapidly as i goes to infinity, the product diverges to zero,
cf. Atkinson and Peijnenburg [2010, Appendix B]), the progress of justification
after n steps may be captured in a lower estimate for the probability of S0:
P (S0) ≥
n∑
`=0
β`
`−1∏
i=0
γi. (2)
In the limit, one would have
P (S0) = lim
n→∞P (Sn+1)
n∏
i=0
γi +
∞∑
`=0
β`
`−1∏
i=0
γi,
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although no infinitist would require that an epistemically responsible agent has
to actually complete an infinite regress: to claim that in order for a belief to
be justified for someone, that person must have actually completed the process
of reasoning to the belief “would be tantamount to rejecting infinitism” (Klein
[1998, p. 920]).
(The limit
∑∞
`=0 β`
∏`−1
i=0 γi exists, cf. Atkinson and Peijnenburg [2010,
Appendix A], whence so does the limit limn→∞ P (Sn+1)
∏n
i=0 γi = P (S0) −∑∞
`=0 β`
∏`−1
i=0 γi.)
This illustration of the progressive and provisional nature of justification can
be used to examine two recent critiques of Kleinian infinitism: the one due to
Podlaskowski and Smith [2011] as well as Turri’s [2009].
Podlaskowski and Smith [2011] admit to be “sympathetic to Klein’s
suggestion that justification is an ongoing process and that there is ’always
a further step that can be taken should we become dissatisfied with the point
at which we stopped the progress of inquiry’ ” (Podlaskowski and Smith [2011,
p. 521] citing Klein [2007b]), but they “doubt that the position, as Klein puts
it, can be maintained easily” (Podlaskowski and Smith [2011, p. 521]). Their
main argument is that on an infinitist account of justification, epistemic agents
not only need infinitely many dispositions to form beliefs, but that these have
to be given in the right order as well. Hence, they argue that while Klein is
justified (if the pun may be excused) in asserting that finite minds may have
infinitely many reasons available (Klein [1999, 2007b]), this availability is only
of use for a perfectly ordered mind that is capable of producing every reason
available when required to do so. Podlaskowski and Smith [2011] doubt that
this is an adequate description of the intellectual faculties of ordinary humans,
dubbing their argument the finite and less-than-ideally-ordered minds objection
(Podlaskowski and Smith [2011, p. 521]). They conclude that an infinitist
account of justification would imply that no real human being would ever be able
to hold justified beliefs, let alone have knowledge; this result is unacceptable
because of the “ought implies can” principle which Podlaskowski and Smith
[2011] also subscribe to. A skeptic, who may live with the notion that human
knowledge is impossible, could, of course, counter this argument by simply
denying this instance of “ought implies can”. A non-skeptic infinitist could still
maintain that with respect to some questions human minds are ideally ordered
and that therefore there are areas where human knowledge is possible even on
an infinitist account of justification. In the case of probabilistic justification,
there is a third way to respond to Podlaskowski and Smith’s argument [2011],
viz. by emphasising the progressive and provisional nature of (probabilistic)
justification: One might argue that probabilistic justification happens gradually
until a sufficient degree of certainty (less than 100%) has been reached — and
above we have given a formal, mathematical description how such an increase
of warrant (in the guise of P (S0)) looks like. Such a view of probabilistic
justification also seems consistent with Klein’s view on the subject, who wrote:
“As the series lengthens, warrant and credibility increase. Nothing prevents it
from increasing to the degree required for knowledge” [2005, p. 138].
Turri [2009, p. 161] writes that even the foundationalist can provide
arbitrarily many — indeed, infinitely many! — reasons for a non-evident
proposition by inserting intermediate reasons between the foundational belief
and the belief in question. Turri conceives of these intermediate reasons as
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being additional pieces in a linear structure of reasons (Turri [2009, figure
on p. 160]). First, it must be noted that inserting such intermediate reasons
per se does not always increase warrant if these intermediate reaons are fitted
into the linear structure of reasons, as Turri suggests. For, suppose S is
probabilistically supported by some contingent1 event U , and suppose that
there is another contingent event, T , which probabilistically supports S and is
itself probabilistically supported by a third contingent event U ; then, whenever
P (S∆T ) = 0 or P (T∆U) = 0,2 the lower bound in the warrant estimate (2) does
not change, even though S and T might not be identical. (It should be noted
that unlike the infinitist, the foundationalist cannot move beyond a certain set
of “foundational” propositions and thus has to work within the bounds of a linear
or at least tree-like structure of reasons.) A defender of Turri’s position might
respond that such a choice of S, T, U is a knife-edge case, viz. bi-implication;
and indeed, such a choice of S, T, U would not be possible in Turri’s specific
example at the end of his paper [2009, p. 163], because in this example the
“β’s”, viz. P (S|{T ) and P (T |{U), are positive (cf. Peijnenburg and Atkinson
[2011, p. 121]). However, Peijnenburg and Atkinson [2011, Sections 5 and 6]
have made a convincing case that the logical structure of Turri’s example at
the end of his paper actually gives rise to an infinite regress of probabilistic
justification — whose consistency follows from the result in Herzberg [2010] or its
generalisation in the present paper. Thus they conclude: “Far from supporting
Turri’s hope that his infinite chain can serve the foundationalist’s purpose, the
above reasoning has provided ammunition for an infinitist new-style. [. . . ] No
anchoring of the infinite sequence of propositions to a basic belief is required.
Nor is it possible” (Peijnenburg and Atkinson [2011, p. 122]).
In addition, Turri [2009, p. 161] asserts that before the foundationalist
stops, she has also increased warrant. This is true, but by refusing to
provide arguments for what she regards as basic beliefs, she makes an ex-ante
commitment not to increase warrant as much as she possibly could!
3 Metaphysical arguments reconsidered
Gillett’s [2003] metaphysical critique echoes a point raised by Fumerton [1998].
Faced with a particularly artificial infinite regress of epistemic justifications, he
wrote that “none of them result in any justified beliefs because I don’t have
any justification for believing the premises of any of the arguments” (Fumerton
[1998, p. 936]). Fumerton recognised that there can be infinite regresses that
are “metaphysically unproblematic” (Fumerton [1998, p. 936]). Gillett [2003]
provides an ontological critique — which he attributes to St Thomas Aquinas —
of non-repeating epistemic justification in so far as they stipulate the existence
of new entities.
Before discussing Gillett’s specific argument, two general points about
ontological critiques of Kleinian infinitism need to be raised: First, one has
to defend Klein against any charge of being short-sighted at this point. Even
though he rarely discusses ontological corollaries of epistemological infinitism,
Klein does insist that only “epistemically responsible” arguments should count
as justifications and prefers at times the term ‘warrant’ to ‘justification’. This
1An event U is called contingent given a probability measure P if and only if 0 < P (U) < 1.
2The symmetric difference of two events A,B is defined as A∆B := (A \B) ∪ (B \A).
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insistence on epistemic responsibility already rules out ontological excesses such
as Fumerton’s example of a polytheistic regress (where the proposition to be
justified is attributed to a certain “god0” and at the same time it is claimed
that “godn+1” asserts the infallibility of judgments by “godn” for all n ∈ N).
The term ‘warrant’ may also be preferable because it does not carry the same
moral connotations that are commonly associated with the term ‘justification’
(cf. e.g. Podlaskowski and Smith [2011, p. 516] and, for a critique of this widely
held view, the article by Fumerton [2001] cited therein). In addition, the term
‘warrant’ has the advantage of directly taking into account Gettier’s insight that
justification may be insufficient to turn true belief into knowledge — warrant
being usually defined as whatever is needed to turn true belief into knowledge.3
The second general point about ontological critiques of infinitism is that
even a non-repeating regress of epistemic justification which introduces a
new entity in each step need not be ontologically extravagant. As we will
see presently, whether such a regress becomes epistemically and ontologically
irresponsible depends very much on the type of entities and the manner in
which they are introduced; consequently, one has to conclude that Gillett’s
Thomist ontologically motivated rejection of infinitism is mistaken (unless the
mathematical actual infinite is denied any status of existence whatsoever).
Gillett [2003] argues against Kleinian infinitism by claiming that Klein
must subscribe to (instances of) the following two ontological principles whose
combination Gillett finds metaphysically absurd. These ontological principles
are (Gillett [2003, p. 712]):
(I) For all entities, an entity x has a property H only in virtue of,
amongst other possible necessary conditions, some entity y having
the property H; and y is H only in virtue of some entity z being H;
etc.
(II) For all entities, if entity x has the property H only in virtue of,
amongst other possible necessary conditions, some entity y having
the property H, then y does not have H in virtue of x being H.
In response to this argument, we shall now give two examples of
metaphysically unproblematic properties which nevertheless satisfy the two
principles (I) and (II) criticised by Gillett. The first example is the property
“E is an event that is probabilistically supported by some other event”;
this is metaphysically unproblematic in light of the consistency theorem for
probabilistic regresses (Herzberg [2010]), as was already noted independently
by Peijnenburg [2010]. The second example is the property of being a finite
ordinal. One can prove that an ordinal α is finite if and only if there exists
some finite ordinal β with β > α. Then, the property of being a finite ordinal
satisfies the principles (I) and (II), but since the property of being a finite ordinal
can be defined otherwise,4 it is ontologically unproblematic.
The crux with Gillett’s argument is that the phrase “having a property H in
virtue of” is ambiguous. Gillett could choose a more moderate position by only
3We have nevertheless decided to stick with the term ‘justification’ for much of this paper
simply because it seems to be the more common terminological choice in the literature.
4In fact, the property of being a finite ordinal, i.e. a natural number, can even be defined
in set-theoretically “robust” terms: It is definable through a ∆0 and thus through an absolute
formula. In other words, whether a given set is a natural number does not depend on the
interpretation in a particular transitive model of set theory (cf. Jech [2010, Lemma 12.10]).
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requiring that any ontologically admissible concept must be definable in some
form which avoids the circular structure of principle (I), as it might happen that
H satisfies principles (I) and (II), but can be defined alternatively and therefore
is ontologically absolutely harmless. However, this stance no longer presents a
categorical opposition to infinitism.
Alternatively, Gillett could reject our counterexamples by adopting an
anti-Platonistic view in the philosophy of mathematics. This would mean,
however, to commit oneself to a relatively specific stance regarding mathematical
ontology, only to exclude a certain option of answering a fundamental
epistemological question. Such a philosophical position looks somewhat
gerrymandered. One might wonder whether anti-Platonism would be coherent
with infinitism of the Kleinian brand. Certainly, Peter Klein’s writings — at
least those with which the author is familiar — do not contain overtly anti-
Platonistic statements; but admittedly, they do not betray an acceptance of
mathematical Platonism either.
4 Addressing foundational reservations against
the consistency proof
As we have seen so far, the consistency of infinite regresses of probabilistic
epistemic justification can be used, either directly or by way of illustration, to
defend epistemological infinitism against diverse epistemological and ontological
objections. Now, the original proof of the consistency of probabilistic regresses
uses nonstandard analysis, and it has sometimes been claimed that nonstandard
proofs are “not constructive”, not even in a broad sense. Recent results from
model theory, however, have in fact shown that nonstandard analysis is, in
a formal mathematical sense, not “less constructive” than classical analysis
(which also employs instances of the Axiom of Choice occasionally, e.g. Zorn’s
Lemma in the proof of the Hahn–Banach theorem), because in Zermelo–Fraenkel
set theory plus Axiom of Choice, there exist definable nonstandard universes
(cf. Kanovei and Shelah [2004], Kanovei and Reeken [2004], and Herzberg
[2008a, 2008b]). Moreover, whilst nonstandard analysis — from an axiomatic
viewpoint a conservative extension of ZFC (e.g. Nelson [1977]) — is of course not
intuitionistic, a closer look at the spirit and motivation of concrete applications
of nonstandard analysis in mathematics reveals that “[t]he distance between
constructive and nonstandard mathematics is [. . . ] actually much smaller than
it appears to be” (Schuster, Berger and Osswald [2002, Foreword, p. ix]). And,
in any case, one can translate any given nonstandard proof into a “standard”
proof by making all the equivalence classes with respect to ultrafilters, which
arguments from nonstandard analysis implicitly involve, explicit (usually at the
cost of an explosion of the proof’s length and complexity).
Nevertheless, an alternative proof — without nonstandard analysis — for
the consistency theorem is desirable for purely pragmatic reasons, since not
every formal epistemologist can be expected to be familiar with nonstandard
methods. Such an alternative, “standard”, proof can be found in the Appendix;
it employs a technical result from the construction of Markov (i.e. memory-less
stochastic) processes, the Daniell–Kolmogorov theorem.5
5It should be mentioned that the Daniell–Kolmogorov theorem admits a particularly simple
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One might ask whether the original, nonstandard proof of the consistency
theorem supplies a general proof technique applicable to non-probabilistic
settings, too. In other words: Is it possible to construct non-probabilistic
examples of non-vicious regresses through a straightforward nonstandard limit
construction? The answer is negative: For, suppose 〈S(n)〉n∈N is a sequence of
(“standard”) mathematical propositions, and assume that there is an infinite
regress of non-probabilistic implication, i.e. ∀n ∈ N (S(n+ 1)⇒ S(n)).
Then, a combination of mathematical induction with the Transfer Principle
of nonstandard analysis would yield merely ∗S(n+ 1)⇒ ∀k ≤ n (∗S(k)) for all
n ∈ ∗N,6 and this formula only carries the regress problem over to a higher
level of infinity (∗N rather than N). Only in the probabilistic setting can a
nonstandard limit construction be used to prove consistency of infinite regresses,
because in that situation the nonstandard limit can be combined with the Loeb
[1975] measure technique of nonstandard probability theory.
5 Conclusion
We have seen that the mathematical analysis of infinite regresses of probabilistic
justification in general, and the consistency theorem for probabilistic regresses in
particular, can be used to fend off several arguments against infinitism, of both
epistemological and ontological kind. The consistency theorem and its proof
are accessible to anyone with some knowledge of measure-theoretic probability
theory and stochastic processes: For, even though the original proof of that
theorem used nonstandard analysis, the present paper contains a proof by means
of classical measure theory (in the Appendix).
A A “standard” proof of the consistency theorem
for probabilistic regresses
For all of this section, we fix two sequences 〈αk〉k∈N, 〈βk〉k∈N ∈ [0, 1]N; as in all
of this paper, N denotes the set of all nonnegative integers. In this section, we
shall prove the following result, which is a slight generalisation of the consistency
theorem in Herzberg [2010]:
Theorem A.1. There exists some probability measure P and some sequence
of P -measurable events 〈Sk〉k∈N such that P (Sk|Sk+1) = αk as well as
P
(
Sk| {Sk+1
)
= βk for all k ∈ N.
Essentially, the proof is based on the construction of a reversed non-
homogeneous Markov chain with state space {0, 1} that was started an infinitely
long time ago. We use the notation
∏
← to refer to products of matrices whose
order of multiplication has been reversed, so that
∏n
←
k=m
T k = Tn · · ·Tm for all
n ≥ m ∈ N. Likewise, ∏∞←
k=m
T k = limn→∞ Tn · · ·Tm.
proof by means of nonstandard analysis, cf. Herzberg [2012].
6To see this, apply the Transfer Principle to the sentence
∀n ∈ N (S(n + 1)⇒ ∀k ≤ n (S(k))), which in turn follows from the hypothesis
∀n ∈ N (S(n + 1)⇒ S(n)) by mathematical induction.
7
For all k ∈ N, put
T k =
(
αk 1− αk
βk 1− βk
)
. (3)
For all j, j′ ∈ N with j′ ≥ j and for all i, i′ ∈ {0, 1}, let
Qj,j
′
i,i′ =
>ei′
j′−1∏
←
k=j
T k
 ei
wherein e0 =
(
0
1
)
and e1 =
(
1
0
)
, and let
Qj,∞i =
>c
 ∞∏
←
k=j
T k
 ei
for some c =
(
1− ε
ε
)
with ε ∈ (0, 1).7 Define for all finite J ⊆ N with
{j1, . . . , j#J}, a measure PJ on {0, 1}J by means of the equation
PJ{~i} =
(
#J−1∏
`=1
Q
j`,j`+1
ij` ,ij`+1
)
Q
j#J ,∞
ij#J
for all ~i ∈ {0, 1}J .
Lemma A.2. PJ is a probability measure on {0, 1}J for all finite J ⊆ N.
Proof. Note that all the T k are transition probability matrices, that the set of
transition probability matrices is closed under multiplication and that the set of
transition probability matrices is a closed subset of the set of matrices of that
dimension. Therefore,
∏
←
k
T k is a transition probability matrix. By definition,
this means that each entry is nonnegative and the sum of each row vector equals
1. Formally, ∏
←
k
T k
( 1
1
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=e0+e1
=
(
1
1
)
,
thus >ei
(∏
←
k
T k
)
(e0 + e1) = 1 for each i ∈ {0, 1}. This immediately entails
that
Qj,j
′
0,i′ +Q
j,j′
1,i′ = 1
for all j, j′ ∈ N and each i′ ∈ {0, 1}. However, it also means that
>c
∏
←
k
T k
 (e0 + e1) = ((1− ε)>e0 + ε>e1)
∏
←
k
T k
 (e0 + e1) = 1
which implies that
Qj,∞0 +Q
j,∞
1 = 1
7In the special case where ε = 1
2
, we have Qj,∞i =
1
2
for all j ∈ N and each i ∈ {0, 1}.
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for all j ∈ N. So,
Qj,j
′
0,i′ +Q
j,j′
1,i′ = 1, Q
j,∞
0 +Q
j,∞
1 = 1
for all j, j′ ∈ N and each i′ ∈ N. This can be used to prove inductively in
#J that
∑
~i∈{0,1}J PJ{~i} = 1. Since clearly PJ{~i} ≥ 0 for all ~i ∈ {0, 1}J , we
conclude that PJ must be a probability measure on {0, 1}J .
Let H be the set of all finite subsets of N.
Lemma A.3. 〈PJ〉J∈H is a projective family of probability measures.
Proof. Let H = J∪{h} with h 6∈ J . Without loss of generality, let h > max J =
j#J . Let pHJ be the projection of H onto J . Then
PH
(
pHJ
−1{~i}
)
= PH
(
{~i} × {0, 1}
)
= PH
(
{~i} × {0}
)
+ PH
(
{~i} × {1}
)
=
(
#J−1∏
`=1
Q
j`,j`+1
ij` ,ij`+1
)
Q
j#J ,h
ij#J ,0
Qh,∞0 +
(
#J−1∏
`=1
Q
j`,j`+1
ij` ,ij`+1
)
Q
j#J ,h
ij#J ,1
Qh,∞1
=
(
#J−1∏
`=1
Q
j`,j`+1
ij` ,ij`+1
)(
Q
j#J ,h
ij#J ,0
Qh,∞0 +Q
j#J ,h
ij#J ,1
Qh,∞1
)
(4)
Now, it is not difficult to verify that
Q
j#J ,h
ij#J ,0
Qh,∞0 +Q
j#J ,h
ij#J ,1
Qh,∞1 = Q
j#J ,∞
ij#J
. (5)
Indeed, e0 >e0 + e1 >e1 =
(
1 0
0 1
)
, hence
Qh,∞0 Q
j#J ,h
ij#J ,0
+Qh,∞1 Q
j#J ,h
ij#J ,1
= >c
 ∞∏
←
k=h
T k
 e0>e0
 h−1∏
←
k=j#J
T k
 eij#J
+>c
 ∞∏
←
k=h
T k
 e1>e1
 h−1∏
←
k=j#J
T k
 eij#J
= >c
 h−1∏
←
k=j#J
T k

 ∞∏
←
k=h
T k
 eij#J = >c
 ∞∏
←
k=j#J
T k
 eij#J = Qj#J ,∞ij#J .
Inserting Equation (5) into Equation (4) yields
PH
(
pHJ
−1{~i}
)
=
(
#J−1∏
`=1
Q
j`,j`+1
ij` ,ij`+1
)
Q
j#J ,∞
ij#J
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whence by definition PH
(
pHJ
−1{~i}
)
= PJ{~i} for arbitrary ~i ∈ {0, 1}J and all
finite H,J ⊆ N with J ⊆ H and # (H \ J) = 1. This implies (cf. Bauer
[2002, p. 307, Bemerkung 2]) that 〈PJ〉J∈H is a projective family of probability
measures.
In the following theorem, P({0, 1})⊗N denotes the infinite product of
countably many identical copies of the power-set of {0, 1}; it is the smallest
σ-algebra with respect to which all projections are measurable. Given any
J ∈ H, the map piJ is the projection onto {0, 1}J defined as the map
piJ : {0, 1}N → {0, 1}J , ω 7→ 〈ω(k)〉k∈J
Theorem A.4. There exists a probability measure P : P({0, 1})⊗N → [0, 1]
such that PJ = P
(
pi−1J (·)
)
for all J ∈ H.
Proof. By the Daniell-Kolmogorov theorem, there must be a probability
measure P on Ω = {0, 1}N such that the finite-dimensional distributions of
the process X defined by Xk : Ω→ {0, 1}, ω 7→ ω(k) (for all k ∈ N) coincide
with the probability measures PJ , J ∈ H.
Now we can, at last, prove the consistency theorem stated at the beginning
as a corollary to Theorem A.4:
Proof of Theorem A.1. Let P and X be as in the proof of Theorem A.4. For all
k ∈ N, set Sk = {Xk = 1}, so that {Sk = {Xk = 0},
Then, for all n > k ∈ N,
P {Xk = 1} = T k · · ·Tn
(
P {Xn+1 = 1}
P {Xn+1 = 0}
)
,
hence
P (Sk) = T
k · · ·Tn
(
P (Sn+1)
1− P (Sn+1)
)
as well as
T k =
(
P ({Xk = 1}| {Xk+1 = 1}) P ({Xk = 0}| {Xk+1 = 1})
P ({Xk = 1}| {Xk+1 = 0}) P ({Xk = 0}| {Xk+1 = 0})
)
,
whence
T k =
(
P (Sk|Sk+1) P
(
{Sk
∣∣Sk+1)
P
(
Sk| {Sk+1
)
P
(
{Sk
∣∣ {Sk+1)
)
.
Comparing this with the definition of T k in Equation (3) leads us to conclude
P (Sk|Sk+1) = αk, P
(
Sk| {Sk+1
)
= βk
for all k ∈ N.
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